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The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian 
Resentments 
ULF BRUNNBAUER 
Center for the Study of Balkan Societies and Cultures (CSBSC), University of Graz, Austria 
 
This article explores the difficult process that attended implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. It 
explores the various resentments the terms of the agreement provoked amongst ethnic 
Macedonians, in particular those dealing with ‘symbolic’ issues, and examines reasons for their 
rejection. These, the author argues, are related to the peculiarities of Macedonian national identity 
as well as to the political dynamics in the country. On the one hand, it is argued, many politicians 
feared for their patriotic credentials if they supported the agreement. On the other hand, large 
parts of Macedonian society saw the very existence of the Macedonian nation under threat. They 
regarded the state as the only protector of their contested national identity and therefore opposed 
the agreement’s goal to rewrite the constitution on purely civic terms with wide-ranging rights for 
the minorities. For many Macedonians, this meant a severe loss of security. Despite this, the author 
concludes that compromises could be found which allows for some optim ism for the future. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
On 8 August 2001 in Ohrid, the leaders of the Republic of Macedonia’s main political parties, 
that since 13 May 2001 had formed a shaky ‘National Unity Government’ , struck a deal 
which aimed at ending the violent conflict between Macedonian security forces and armed 
Albanian extremists in the country. The fighting had begun in February 2001 and resulted in 
more than 200 casualties, among them over sixty Macedonian soldiers and policemen. More 
than 100,000 persons were exiled or internally displaced, and relations between the ethnic 
Macedonian majority of the country and the Albanian minority reached a record low (for the 
course of last year’s events see Brunnbauer 2001a). In order to prevent fully-fledged civil war 
from breaking out, Prime-Minister Ljubcho Georgievski (‘Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organisation–Democratic Party of National Unity’ , VMRO-DPMNE), Branko Crvenkovski 
(‘Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia’ , SDSM), Arben Xhaferi (‘Democratic Party of the 
Albanians’ , DPA) and Ymer Ymeri (‘Party of Democratic Prosperity’ , PDP –  the second 
Albanian party) agreed on a package of wide-ranging amendments to the constitution and far-
reaching legislative changes that should meet the Albanians’  long-standing demands. The 
agreement came after weeks of intense negotiations, in which two international mediators 
(François Léotard for the EU and James Pardew for the USA) took part. It was to be ratified 
by the party-leaders on 13 August. 
 
However, the ink on the agreement had not yet dried when new outbreaks of violence called 
its ratification into question. On the same day, 8 August, a military convoy came under fire 
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and ten reservists were killed.1 Responsibility for this attack was claimed by the ‘Albanian 
National Army’  (ANA, Albanian abbreviation: AKSh). ANA was allegedly founded in late 
1999 by disaffected Kosovo UÇ K fighters who had not found a role for themselves in the new 
life of post-war Kosovo, and stood for the unification of all Albanian areas in South East 
Europe and opposed the Ohrid Agreement (Mappes-Niediek 2001: 7).2 The fact that eight of 
the soldiers killed came from the southern Macedonian town of Prilep sparked nationalistic 
violence there. A crowd of several thousand people took to the streets, destroying Albanian 
property and setting the central mosque in flames. Like with anti-Albanian riots in Bitola 
earlier the same year, the police did not intervene in order to protect Albanian property and 
lives.3 Also in Skopje several Albanian shops and coffee-houses were destroyed.4 At the same 
time, fresh fighting broke out in Tetovo, where the UÇ K was increasing territory under its 
control, eventually reducing the area controlled by the state to police stations and police 
checkpoints (Brunnbauer 2001b: 8). The UÇ K had utilized the cease-fire, which had been in 
force since 6 July, to improve its position in Tetovo and the surrounding areas. Expulsions of 
ethnic Macedonians from Tetovo and its surrounding villages by Albanian extremists further 
infuriated public opinion. On 10 August, the next challenge to the ratification of the 
Agreement was set in motion: Minister of the Interior Ljube Boshkovski, who was widely 
regarded as one of the most hawkish of the Macedonian authorities, sent police forces into the 
Albanian village of Ljuboten in Skopska Crna Gora (just a few kilometres to the north of 
Skopje), after eight Macedonian soldiers had been killed by a land-mine in the vicinity of the 
village. According to the police, the culprits of the attack were hiding in Ljuboten. The village 
was sealed off, and police began to shell it indiscriminately.  
 
On Sunday, 12 August, police forces entered the village and began a house-to-house search 
for alleged Albanian UÇ K-‘terrorists’ . According to Human Rights Watch, which 
investigated the events in Ljuboten immediately after the police had left, ten Albanian 
civilians were killed by the police, seven of them shot deliberately, some at point-blank range. 
More than one hundred Albanian men were arrested and taken to police stations in Skopje 
where they were abused, before being released. Neither did the police attempt to prevent 
Macedonian civilians from beating up Albanians who tried to flee from the village. According 
                                                     
1 RFE/RL Newsline, 9 August 2001. http://www.rferl.org/newsline. 
2 At the beginning of December 2001, President Bush prohibited members of ANA from entering the United 
States and decreed a financial embargo on the group (RFE/RL Newsline, 5 December 2001. 
http://www.rferl.org/newsline). 
3 Dnevnik, 9 August 2001. 
4 Makedonija 31 (10-23 August 2001), S. 9; RFE/RL Newsline, 9 August 2001. http://www.rferl.org/newsline. 
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to Human Rights Watch, not a single piece of credible evidence for the presence of UÇ K 
rebels in the village was produced, despite the size of the police operation (Human Rights 
Watch 2001). Instead, the operation was purely a manifestation of strength and an ill-fated 
attempt to obstruct a political settlement to the conflict. Police brutality was so extensive that 
the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague initiated an investigation into the role of 
minister Boshkovski, who was present in Ljuboten during the police operation, at least on 12 
August. 
 
Under such circumstances strong international pressure was definitely required to ensure that 
the party leaders eventually ratified the Agreement on 13 August. The event itself was, 
nevertheless, very low key. National television did not broadcast it live, and the signatories to 
the Agreement did not display any great relief. On the contrary, an infuriated Prime Minister 
Georgievski left the press conference after the ratification as a consequence of Arben Xhaferi 
giving his statement to the press in Albanian without translation. The difficulties involved in 
reaching the agreement and the corollaries of its ratification therefore already provided a 
foretaste of the problems that were in store for its implementation. 
 
II. The Ohrid Agreement 
 
The ‘Framework Agreement’  5 consisted of three parts: first, far-reaching amendments to the 
Macedonian constitution; second, changes to the current legislation; and third, a plan to end 
hostilities as well as a timetable for its implementation (for detailed analyses of the agreement 
see: Whyte 2001, Brunnbauer 2001c, Brunnbauer 2001d: 348-54). In short, the main 
provisions of the Agreement were: 
· The Preamble to the constitution should be changed in a way to declare the Republic 
of Macedonia a state of all its citizens:  
The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, taking over responsibility for the 
present and future of their fatherland, aware and grateful to their 
predecessors for their sacrifice and dedication in their endeavors and 
struggle to create an independent and sovereign state of Macedonia, and 
responsible to future generations to preserve and develop everything that is 
valuable from the rich cultural inheritance and coexistence within 
Macedonia, equal in rights and obligations towards the common good –  the 
Republic of Macedonia, (… ).6 
                                                     
5 For the English text of the Framework Agreement see: <http://www.president.gov.mk/eng/info/dogovor.htm>, 
16 August 2001. Macedonian version: <http://www.president.gov.mk/mak/info/dogovor.htm>, 16 August 2001. 
6 http://www.president.gov.mk/eng/info/dogovor.htm, 18 August 2001. 
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The existing Preamble had defined the Republic of Macedonia as the 
(… ) [N]ational state of the Macedonian people, which guarantees the full 
civic equality and permanent co-existence of the Macedonian people with 
the Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma and the other nationalities (… ).7 
 
Ever since the passing of the constitution in 1991, the Preamble was a major point of 
contention for the Albanians because they demanded equal status as the second 
constitutive people of the Republic. Eventually they agreed on the civic concept. The 
Agreement laid out also includes changes to some other articles of the constitution 
which previously had given the Macedonian people preferential treatment. The new 
wording of the constitution does not use the terms ‘Macedonian people’ , 
‘nationalities’ , and ‘minorities’ , but rather speaks of ‘majority population’ , 
‘communities’  and ‘communities not in the majority’ . 
· The Agreement met the Albanian demands with regard to establishing the official 
status of the Albanian language. Every other language other than Macedonian –  which 
remains the main official language, to be used for example in foreign relations –  that is 
spoken by more than 20 per cent of the population will henceforth be an official 
language on the central level as well as in communities where more than 20 per cent 
of the population speak that other official language. In fact, only Albanian fulfils this 
condition. Languages other than Macedonian which are spoken by at least 20 per cent 
of the inhabitants of a municipality will, however, also serve as an official language in 
local self government. Furthermore, the government will henceforth have to provide 
university education for language communities which speak another official language 
than Macedonian. This way the protracted ‘Albanian university’  issue, which has been 
a cornerstone of Albanian political activism in Macedonia since the early 1990s, 
should finally be put to rest. 
· New parliamentary procedures require a majority also “ of the Representatives 
claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of 
Macedonia”  in order to pass laws “ that directly affect culture, use of language, 
education, personal documentation, and use of symbols” . This provision also applies 
for the election of a third of the judges of the Constitutional Court, the members of the 
Republican Judicial Council, and the Ombudsman. The latter will give particular 
attention to the principles of non-discrimination and equitable representation of 
                                                     
7 “ Ustav na Republika Makedonija”  [Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia], 1991. 
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communities in public bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life. It will be up 
to the members of the parliament, however, to decide whether they are members of the 
majority or not. According to Nicholas Whyte, “ [i]t is probably as close as you can get 
to the ideal of a civic democracy in an ethnically divided society”  (2001: 2). 
· The Agreement provides for stronger participation of members of the minorities in 
public institutions, as ‘equitable representation’  now becomes a constitutional 
principle. The state will continue its practice of positive discrimination of minorities in 
university enrolment. On the other hand, in the crucial sphere of the police, it was 
agreed that by 2004 the police force should roughly represent the ethnic composition 
of the country. In other words, in July 2002 and 2003 respectively, 500 new policemen 
from minorities will be employed annually. Here, the European Union, the USA and 
the OSCE have pledged financial, technical and training support for the new police 
forces. Policemen from minorities should mainly be assigned to regions where their 
ethnic group lives. 
· The Agreement further provides for far-reaching decentralization of “ possibly the 
most centralized state in Europe”  (Loomis, Davis and Broughton 2001: 9). Local 
governments have as a result gained significantly more competencies. In order to 
make them viable entities, however, the financing of local government should be put 
on a sounder footing, and the numbers of municipalities should be reduced from the 
current number of 123 to 87. The Agreement also gave local governments a voice in 
the appointment of local heads of police, and the latter will report regularly and upon 
request to the council of the municipality concerned. Nevertheless, local police will 
remain under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, despite the initial demands 
of the Albanian parties to put them under the authority of local councils. 
· As regards the cessation of hostilities, NATO troops were invited to collect the 
weapons of the UÇ K and to supervise its demobilization, a mission which NATO 
referred to as ‘Essential Harvest’ . NATO and the UÇ K agreed that 3,300 weapons 
should be collected from the UÇ K, despite government claims that the UÇ K possessed 
up to 85,000 weapons (Alagjozovski 2001). The process of amending the constitution 
should start after the first third of the weapons has been handed in. After final 
demobilization of the UÇ K, the Macedonian parliament was to pass the main 
amendments to the constitution and some accompanying laws by 27 September 2001 
at the latest. Some other new laws were planned to be passed before early elections 
had been called or before the end of 2002 respectively. As a consequence, the 
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redeployment of Macedonian security forces in the insurgent areas should gradually 
commence under international supervision after demobilization of the UÇ K. 
This timetable soon proved over-optimistic owing to ethnic Macedonian attempts to 
renegotiate some issues of the Agreement, or to bring it down altogether. NATO declared 
‘Essential Harvest’  successfully completed on 26 September after the UÇ K had handed in 
more than 3,800 weapons, and Ali Ahmeti (the UÇ K’s political leader) declared the rebel 
organization dissolved on 27 September. Despite this, it took parliament until 16 November 
2001 before it passed the constitutional amendments. Once again strong international pressure 
was necessary (Brunnbauer 2001d: 349). More recently, the law on local self-government, 
which was another major element of the Framework Agreement and a precondition for the 
holding of the international donors conference for Macedonia, was passed only on 24 January 
2002, after an initial draft presented in December 2001 had been rejected by the ethnic 
Macedonian parties. The whole process of implementing the Framework Agreement proved 
that external monitoring, support and occasionally intervention is crucial for the realization of 
the planned reforms because, without international mediation, the political parties in the 
Republic of Macedonia hardly find compromises on those vital issues. 
 
III. Macedonian Opposition 
 
What I hope to show in this paper is that the Macedonian opposition to the agreement was 
more than the usual tactics of filibustering in the Macedonian parliament. Through their 
opposition, Macedonian politicians consciously articulated and at the same time manipulated 
widespread fears among ethnic Macedonians about their national identity, which many saw 
threatened by the terms of the Agreement. As a consequence, opposition arose mainly to those 
provisions which dealt with the identity of the state and had a more symbolic character. The 
far-reaching changes concerning the official use of other languages, or the introduction of 
‘double majorities’  in parliament did not, by contrast, provoke much public debate. Much 
more contested issues were the Preamble to the constitution, the paragraphs on the 
relationship between the state and church, as well as the law on local self-government. 
Legislative changes in these areas were directly related to the way ethnic Macedonians view 
themselves and the character of their state. It is therefore necessary to first shed some light on 
the peculiarities of Macedonian national identity as well as the relations between 
Macedonians and Albanians in the country –  two problems that are in fact closely interrelated 
(see Voss 2001). However, it must be mentioned at the outset that the political and intellectual 
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elite of the country, who are the essential agents of Macedonian nation-building, seemed to be 
more resentful of the peace accord than ‘ordinary’  Macedonians.8 
 
Powerlessness and defensive nationalism 
Ethnic Macedonian public opinion was largely hostile to the Agreement. Editorials in leading 
newspapers called it a fatal indulgence to ‘terrorism’  which would put the country’s future 
existence under threat because the ‘real’  aims of the extremist Albanians were not the 
acquisition of rights but territories. A number of commentaries compared the Agreement to 
earlier Balkan peace treaties (see Buechsenschuetz 2001: 2). The influential daily Dnevnik 
compared it with the Dayton peace accord of 1995; the big daily Utrinski vesnik drew a 
parallel with the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, which divided the geographic region of 
Macedonia between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia after the conclusion of the Second Balkan 
War. Such assessments evoked the notion of Macedonia being (again) the victim of Great-
Power interference and unjust peace settlements (see Voss 2001: 273-4). Macedonian 
intellectuals and politicians, and also many ordinary Macedonians, felt betrayed by the 
international community, especially by the USA and NATO, who were said to be siding with 
the Albanians. The prominent Macedonian movie-maker Milcho Manchevski (director of the 
movie ‘Before the Rain‘), for example, referred to Macedonia as the ‘collateral damage’  of 
NATO’s Balkan policy (Manchevski 2001: 2). Comparing the situation to 1913, when, 
according to the mainstream view, the ‘ethnic territory’  of Macedonia was partitioned, some 
academics have even argued that Macedonia again had no real allies and had to stand alone in 
its struggle for existence.9 Many also fear that Bulgaria and Greece still has residual designs 
on Macedonia and want to destabilize the country as a means of occupying its territory. Keith 
Brown once wrote about such concerns, that they 
 
resonate with the history that most Macedonians have learned either in school or from 
older family members, of a people who have repeatedly been incorporated into the state 
projects of powerful and more numerous others (2000: 135). 
 
 
The Ohrid Agreement was perceived by most Macedonians as a severe loss of security 
(International Crisis Group 2001c: 9). This feeling of powerlessness has much to do with the 
way Macedonian national identity was formed and how national history is written. The 
                                                     
8 According to a poll conducted in December 2001, some 51 per cent of the ethnic Macedonians opposed the 
Agreement, while almost 44 per cent approved it. Among the Albanians, the Agreement had an approval-rate of 
78 per cent. RFE/RL Newsline, 4 September 2001. http://www.rferl.org/newsline. 
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Macedonians were a late-comer to the nations of the Balkans, and their identity was not 
affirmed before the creation of a Macedonian People’s Republic as part of the Yugoslav 
Federation in 1944. Before 1944, and especially before the Second World War, Macedonian 
national consciousness had existed only amongst rather marginal groups of intellectuals and 
political activists, many of whom had joined Tito’s partisans in their war against German and 
Italian occupation. Macedonian national identity was therefore, above everything else, forged 
against claims by other, more powerful, nations because the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek 
nations claimed the Slavic Orthodox population of Macedonia as part of its own nation. 
During Yugoslav times, Macedonian national identity had a strong anti-Bulgarian edge, as the 
Bulgarians were culturally closest to the Macedonians and the need to create cultural 
differences against them was felt most urgently –  also because Bulgaria was such a faithful 
ally to the Soviet Union (Palmer and King 1971: 153-4; Troebst 1992: 436). Serbian 
influences, on the other hand, were strongly felt in the process of Macedonian nation-building 
(Palmer and King 1971: 157). The dissolution of Yugoslavia and eventual independence, 
which was more accepted than actively sought by the Macedonian leaders, brought 
Macedonians into a precarious situation. First of all, they were no longer citizens of a big, 
respected and militarily powerful country, but henceforward rather a weak and poor state. 
Their existence as a nation was still not accepted by all neighbouring states, with Bulgaria 
refusing to recognize the Macedonian language and nation, the Serb Orthodox Church 
refusing to accept the autonomy of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, and Greece voicing 
strong opposition to the self-styled name of the new state and hence delaying its international 
recognition. In such a situation, “ Macedonian nationalism grows not so much from pride, but 
from desperation to survive”  (Loomis, Davis and Broughton 2001: 12). The Albanian 
insurgency of 2001 could not but intensify among Macedonians the feeling that their national 
existence was threatened. Some Macedonian historians spoke of the ‘Greater-Albanian’  
project of the Albanians in Macedonia as well as of the Albanian state. They draw a parallel 
between the current Albanian demands and the Greater Albania of World War Two, which 
was a creation of Fascist Italy and Nazi-Germany.10  
 
The fear of Albanian secessionism, however, is often aggravated by demographic fears 
because Albanians have a much higher rate of growth than ethnic Macedonians and live 
primarily in the border regions to Kosovo and Albania. Ethnic Macedonians are therefore 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 See e.g. the interview with one of the leading Macedonian academics, Blaž e Ristovski, in Makedonsko sontse 
356 (20 April 2001): 10.  
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afraid of losing ‘their’  country to the Albanians. They also deplore the fact that many 
Albanians have immigrated from Kosovo. In an atmosphere of extensive discourses on 
national identity and the threats to it, most ethnic Macedonians see only one protector of their 
existence as a nation: the state. 
 
The State as the protector of national identity 
 
Many Macedonians see their security as vested in a state that their language often 
represents as exclusively ‘theirs’  (Brown 2000: 135). 
 
 
The history of the Macedonian nation proves the claim, made by modernist theoreticians of 
the nation, that nations are not so much the causes but rather the consequences of the creation 
of modern national states and their specific policies aiming at national integration and cultural 
homogenization (Hobsbawm 1990). It was the policy of the leadership of the Macedonian 
Republic within the socialist Yugoslav federation that gave the Macedonians all the attributes 
of a self-confident nation (language, history, religion, ancestry). This process –  well described 
by Stephen Palmer and Robert King (1971: 153-74) –  led to an almost congruent 
identification of the Macedonian nation with the state. The various constitutions of the 
Republic of Macedonia (before and after 1991) paid tribute, to different degrees, to the 
multiethnic character of the Republic. But state policies were clearly aimed at fostering 
Macedonian national identity (Troebst 1992: 431-2; Willemsen and Troebst 2001: 305), while 
the minorities were rather treated as guests with certain rights. The strong correspondence 
between the Macedonian state and the national identity of its Macedonian population was also 
articulated in the constitution of 1991. While most parts of the constitution followed a civic 
model, its Preamble declared only the Macedonian people a constitutive nation of the new 
state, at the same time guaranteeing equal treatment to the ‘nationalities’ . Although the 
constitution of 1991 was certainly an advance in comparison to the one promulgated in 1989 
(Willemsen and Troebst 2001: 308f.), it nonetheless reflected the feeling of most 
Macedonians that this state was theirs. The concept of civic identity, however, is still 
extremely weak, and many Macedonians therefore resented the proposed change of the 
constitution’s Preamble because they were afraid of losing the state for whose recognition 
they had to fight so hard. Politicians and intellectuals voiced concerns that, if the Macedonian 
people were not explicitly mentioned in the preamble to the constitution, the very existence of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 See e.g. the interview with Mihailo Minovski in Fokus 23 (24 April 2001): 23-6. 
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the Macedonian nation would be in danger. This view resonates with the widespread notion 
among ethnic Macedonians that they, as a nation, have fought for centuries for their own 
national state, which they now do not want to share with anyone else. Historiography 
propagates the view that the largest part of the ‘ethno-historical’  territory of the Macedonians 
was grabbed by Greece and Bulgaria, but that at least the little that has remained should be 
ethnically Macedonian in outlook.11 Accordingly, two Macedonian opposition parties 
(Democratic Alternative and ‘Real’  VMRO) opposed the new Preamble because that would 
have extinguished the historic development of the Macedonian state.12 Also, politicians from 
the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party said they would not vote for the new Preamble. President 
Boris Trajkovski, for example, asked US-President George W. Bush to help find a new 
compromise. The Albanian parties, on the other hand, rejected any re-negotiation. Finally, the 
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and EU High Representative for Common Foreign 
and Security Policy Javier Solana negotiated a new Preamble, which was eventually passed 
by parliament on 16 November 2001. It reads: 
 
The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as those 
citizens who live within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia and are members of 
the Albanian people, the Turkish people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, the 
Roma people and of other peoples, take on themselves the responsibility for the present 
and the future of their fatherland (.).13 
 
 
Similar opposition as to that witnessed with the draft-preamble was voiced by the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church, especially to the new text of § 19 of the constitution, which separates state 
and church and gives religious communities the right to establish schools. The Macedonian 
Orthodox Church rejected the fact that it is mentioned on an equal footing with the Islamic 
Community, the Catholic Church and other denominations. It argued that it should be granted 
special status at least in Macedonia, since it was not recognized by the other Orthodox 
churches. The head of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, Archbishop of Ohrid Stefan, 
declared that the names of all members of parliament who voted for the proposal would be 
announced in church services. VMRO-DPMNE supported the church’s cause, and a new 
compromise had to be reached (Stojanovska 2001). It consisted in the insertion of “ as well as”  
                                                     
11 See for example the interview with Blaž e Ristovski quoted above or the recent publication of Stoian 
Kiselinovski, who develops the concept of ’Macedonian ethnic space‘, parts of which have been ’de-Slavised 
and ’de-Macedonised‘ respectively (2000: 49). 
12 “ Preambulata ne treba da se menuva”  [“ The Preamble Must Not Be Changed” ]. 
wysiwyg://639/http://www.a1.com.mk.vesti/vest.asp?VestiID=3306, 30 October 2001.  
13 Dnevnik, 27 October 2001. 
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between the “ Macedonian Orthodox Church”  and the “ Islamic Community”  in order to make 
the Macedonian Orthodox Church stand out.14 
 
Whose is the state? Macedonian and Albanian claims 
Macedonian anxieties concern material issues as well. The Yugoslav Macedonian Republic 
did not only create and disseminate Macedonian national identity, but the state also provided 
large parts of the population with employment in the fast growing bureaucracy as well as the 
new industries. However, recruitment patterns after 1944 especially for administrative jobs 
had a clear ethnic pattern. This was on the one hand the consequence of the effort to establish 
a Macedonian nation, which gave state benefits mainly to ethnic Macedonians, whose feeling 
of belonging to the ‘imagined community’  of the Macedonian nation should be fostered. But, 
on the other hand, Albanians and Turks had an even lower level of educational achievement 
than the Orthodox Slavic population. The participation of tens of thousands of Macedonians 
in the administrative machinery of the Republic gave them a personal interest in the existence 
of the state and strengthened their identification with the new nation (see Palmer and King 
1971: 141). In all levels of administration and government, the minorities were 
underrepresented, and also in industry Macedonians had a bigger share of employment than 
their share of the population (ibid., 178-80). The Albanian minority remained, on the contrary, 
much more rural, and when land became increasingly scarce, many Albanian men went to 
Western Europe as labour migrants. Aside from this, Albanian intellectual and political 
aspirations did not gravitate towards Skopje but towards Pristina, where most Macedonian 
Albanians with an academic degree had pursued their studies. Politically active Albanians 
were more eager to demand incorporation of the Albanian areas of Macedonia in the 
Autonomous Province of Kosovo than to seek more rights within the Republic of Macedonia 
(see Palmer and King 1971: 181; Reuter 1982: 93; Poulton 1995: 126). Albanian nationalist 
flare-ups in Macedonia, such as occurred in 1968 and 1981, were quite easily contained by the 
Macedonian leadership as Kosovo provided some sort of safety-valve for Macedonian-
Albanian activism. During the 1980s, however, the Macedonian government imposed 
repressive measures against its Albanian population (Poulton 1995: 127-9; Mickey and 
Albion 1993: 57-8) that strengthened the historical experience among the Albanians of 
discrimination and alienation from the Macedonian state, which in turn has had repercussions 
on their contemporary political attitudes. 
 
                                                     
14 Dnevnik, 27 October 2001. 
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Things changed radically with the independence of Macedonia (1991) on the one hand and 
the de facto removal of Kosovo’s autonomy by Slobodan Milosevic (1989/90) on the other. 
Albanians, who gained a much higher level of political representation in Macedonia than 
before, began to challenge the Macedonians’  exclusive rights to the state. Albanians did not 
accept their treatment as a minority because they constituted, according to their view, some 30 
to 40 per cent of the population of the country. Although this is an exaggeration, and a more 
likely figure for the Albanian population is between 25 and 28 per cent of the total,15 it is 
quite clear that such a large minority cannot not be expected to accommodate with the same 
status as a minority which constitutes, say, two per cent of the overall population. Albanians 
therefore demanded to be considered the second constitutive people of the Republic of 
Macedonia and to have equal access to the resources of the state. Despite Albanian parties 
having been part of the government since 1992, this did not significantly improve the lot of 
their electorate. It was rather the party active and its clientele that enjoyed the gains of being 
in power.16 Some measures of positive discrimination to improve Albanian participation in 
state employment were nonetheless initiated, especially after 1998 under the new VMRO-
DPMNE and DPA-government, but they proved to be too slow to ease Albanian grievances.  
 
Actually, Albanians remained underrepresented in all fields of the formal economy, which 
cannot be explained only by their lower qualifications and their more rural life-styles but is 
more likely the result of ethnically discriminatory recruitment patterns. In 2001, for example 
84.5 per cent of those employed were ethnic Macedonians compared to 7.5 per cent Albanians 
whereas 20 per cent of those registered as unemployed were Albanian (Najchevska 2001: 11). 
Among public servants, 10 per cent are Albanian, and in 1997 only 4 per cent of the police 
force were of ethnic Albanian origin (Brunnbauer 2001a: 168). The constant as well as often 
aggressive and violent refusal of Albanian demands by the Macedonians therefore created a 
fertile soil for the growth of Albanian extremism among those parts of the Albanian 
population which did not profit from close relations with the Albanian parties in power. On 
the other hand, the Macedonian economy has been in a deep crisis for much of the last decade 
                                                     
15 According to the internationally funded and monitored census of 1994, the share of the Albanians was 22.67 
per cent, but its results were not recognised by Macedonian Albanian leaders who claimed deliberate under-
counting of Albanians. 
16 The relative stability of the VMRO-DPMNE and DPA government, which was established in 1998 and 
survived the influx of some 350,000 Kosovo-Albanian refugees in 1999 was explained by the division of the 
state’s resources between the two coalition partners. It is said that the non-interference of the authorities in the 
alleged smuggling activities of DPA vice-chairman Menduh Thaçi across the border to Kosovo is part of the 
unofficial coalition agreement. This non-interference also led to a dramatic reduction of police forces in the 
Albanian rural areas. 
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owing to a whole host of factors: the breakdown of Yugoslavia, structural imbalances, 
economic restructuring, the Greek economic blockade until 1995, the UN-embargo against 
Yugoslavia until 2000, the Kosovo War and the refugee crisis of 1999. The resulting strained 
economic opportunities and high unemployment (around 30-40 per cent) made the ethnic 
Macedonian population even less inclined to share the little that had been left from socialist 
economic development. Hence their reluctance to relinquish their constitutionally and 
politically guaranteed preferential rights, which were symbolic but deeply inscribed in the 
ethnic Macedonian consciousness and their attitudes towards the state. The current conflict is 
therefore very much also one about economic resources which are closely connected to 
political power and organization of the state. 
 
Cultures and societies apart 
Since independence, the main Albanian demands (such as for university education in 
Albanian, the status of second constitutive people for the Albanians and status of second 
official language for Albanian) were always quashed by the dominant Macedonian parties. 
Nevertheless, some progress was made, though disappointingly slow. Macedonian politicians 
did not recognize the changed dynamics as a result of the war in Kosovo that had provided 
extremist Albanians in Macedonia with a precedent that the use of violence could pay off. On 
the contrary, ethnic Macedonian and Albanian politicians of the ruling parties continued to 
speak of relaxed interethnic relations, an illusion that was shared by the international 
community, although some observers warned about potential conflicts. ‘Ethnobarometer’  for 
example stated in a report of early 2001, before violence broke out: 
 
The climate in the country is of widespread pessimism. Some of the statements made 
from both sides, but especially from the Macedonian one, were extremely polemic and 
maximalist in tone (...).  (...) [T]he almost total absence of dialogue and social inter-
action between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in everyday life is rather 
striking (quoted in Ethnobarometer 2001: 9). 
 
 
This statement points to one of the major reasons for the Macedonian rejection of Albanian 
political demands in general and the Ohrid Agreement in particular: the deep divide between 
the Macedonian and Albanian populations in the country, a divide that concerns almost all 
walks of life. Here is not the place to describe these differences in detail, but some facts must 
suffice. The major difference, which has important social, economic and cultural 
consequences, is that Macedonians have become much more urbanized than Albanians after 
Macedonia had embarked on a process of industrialization and urbanization in the 1950s. 
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While most Albanians still live in the countryside, the overwhelming majority of 
Macedonians by contrast live in towns. Many Macedonians now deplore that urbanization has 
led to the ‘Albanization’  of Macedonian territory because the Albanians would follow a 
deliberate policy of demographic and territorial expansion. The Albanian Muslims 
 
(… ) were perceived often as occupying the physical and imagined territory of the 
countryside from which Macedonians left in the time of socialist Yugoslavia. This 
identification of Albanians clearly represented a negatively charged stereotype, imbued 
with certain qualities of alleged ‘backwardness’  (Brown 2000: 125). 
 
 
The rural lifestyles of many Albanians contribute to their marginalization on the labour 
market (as well as being a result of this) and also to the continuity of patriarchal values.17 
Family and kin relations have much more importance among them due to their lack of trust in 
formal institutions. This nurtures fears among the Macedonians, who perceive Albanian 
micro-communities as virtually impenetrable and thus hard to control. Marginality, 
patriarchalism and rurality also have an impact on the demographic behaviour of the 
Albanians (see the older but still valuable study by Grossmith 1977).  
 
Although the birth rate among Albanians has experienced a decline over the last decades, it is 
still much higher than among the Macedonians. In 1999, 13,308 Macedonian mothers gave 
birth compared to 9,838 of Albanian mothers, while the Macedonian population roughly 
doubles the Albanian one (State Statistical Office 2000: 115). Albanians contribute almost 70 
per cent to the natural growth of the population in Macedonia. The Albanian population is 
also heavily concentrated in the north-western parts of the country, where, especially in the 
villages, very few ethnic Macedonians are left. In twelve municipalities (out of a total of 123), 
Albanians make up more than 95 per cent of the population, in five between 75 and 95 per 
cent and in eight between 50 and 75 per cent (ibid., 102). Outside the regions with an 
Albanian majority, mainly the capital Skopje, have a significant Albanian population 
(approximately 25 per cent). In Albanian villages in western Macedonia one could perfectly 
grow up and live one’s life without ever coming into contact with ethnic Macedonians. But 
even in mixed towns and cities social interaction is very limited. The minimal figure of only 
sixteen mixed marriages in 1999 are impressive proof of this.18 
 
                                                     
17 A good indicator for that is the very low employment rate of Albanian women: in 1999, only 5,261 out of 
49,131 employed Albanians (i.e. 10.7 per cent) were female (State Statistical Office 2000: 187).  
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Macedonians and Albanians also hardly communicate with each other beyond the occasional 
chevap in an Albanian grill-bar, read different newspapers, go to different primary and 
secondary schools, listen to different radio stations and watch different TV-programs. 
Macedonians, especially, are largely ignorant of the Albanians because hardly anyone speaks 
their language. Mutual perceptions are fraught with prejudices, and Macedonians often voice 
anti-Islamic sentiments vis-à-vis the Albanians (who are overwhelmingly Muslim). Albanians 
are usually portrayed as an homogenous mass regardless of the actual divisions among them, 
which are for instance illustrated by the hostile attitude that the two main Albanian displayed 
towards each other during the last decade, although both parties shared basically the same 
program. 
 
From a political point of view, a major consequence of the big divide is that most 
Macedonians assume that Albanians have a hidden agenda.19 During the conflict in 2001, 
Arben Xhaferi, leader of DPA, who in the West is regarded a moderate, was usually portrayed 
by the Macedonian media as the devil who wanted to destroy Macedonia and employed 
‘terrorists’  to achieve this aim. As evidence of this attitude, one need only look at a recent 
interview with the influential intellectual and member of the Macedonian Academy of 
Science Blaž e Ristovski who claimed that Macedonia faced ‘Kosovo-ization’  and ‘IRA-
ization’  because the UÇ K had a terrorist and a political wing, the latter consisting of the 
Albanian parties in the Macedonian government and parliament.20 Macedonian historians 
actively cultivate such views when they speak of a long tradition of Greater-Albanian 
ideology among the Albanians of former Yugoslavia. This view is widely shared by the ethnic 
Macedonian population and public. As a result, Albanian demands, however specific, are 
often regarded as a first-step towards secession (see Hatschikjan 2001: 325). 
 
The fear that awarding more rights to the Albanians would imperil the state’s further 
existence came to the fore in the debates over decentralization which constituted one of the 
major elements of the Ohrid Agreement. Both Macedonians and Albanians seemed to regard 
devolution of power to the local governments as a zero-sum game, where one gained control 
over communities at the expense of the other (Loomis, Davis and Broughton 2001: 17). The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 Statistički pregled, 2.4.011 (2000): 35.  
19 These assumptions do not completely come out of the blue. Especially in the early 1990s, radical Albanians 
pursued a policy of federalization with the perspective of secession, illustrated for example by an autonomy 
referendum in western Macedonia in February 1992 (Mickey and Albion 1993: 65). Also statements of leading 
Albanian politicians about their final goals are sometimes rather ambivalent (Hatschikjan 2001: 326). 
20 Makedonsko sontse 356 (20 April 2001): 9.  
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Macedonians fear that the Albanians, once in control of local governments with more powers, 
would start to severe the links to the central government, eventually pulling away from the 
Macedonian state as such. “ They also fear that the Macedonian identity will be threatened in 
those areas in which Albanians dominate”  (Loomis, Davis and Broughton 2001: 17). 
Macedonian politicians saw their concerns confirmed, when the Minister for Local 
Government, Faik Arslani (DPA), submitted to the parliament an ill-advised draft for the new 
law on local self-government. The draft proposed not only wide-ranging competencies for 
local communities in education and health care, but also the possibility for communities to 
merge and create common administrations (Brunnbauer 2001d: 363). Macedonian suspicions 
that this would lead to the creation of an autonomous Albanian region in north-western 
Macedonia through the back door were not unfounded. There were also concerns that state 
authority in Albanian areas would be further weakened if devolution went too far. Advocates 
of such a notion often referred to the problematic attitudes of Albanians toward formal 
institutions in Albania and Kosovo. As a result, both of the main Macedonian parties rejected 
the draft agreement although this led to a delay of the international donors conference. The 
Albanian parties, in their turn, began to boycott parliament sessions as long as the 
Macedonian parties did not withdraw their amendments to the draft law (the boycott of 
parliament used to be one of the Albanian parties’  preferred tactics when they were faced with 
votes in parliament they would not win). It took painstaking international mediation, mainly 
by Javier Solana, to reach a compromise that was finally passed by an almost unanimous vote 
on 25 January 2002.21 
 
IV. Outlook 
 
The peculiarities of the Macedonian project of nation-building shape the reactions of 
Macedonians to the Ohrid Agreement. This should not, however, lead to the conclusion that 
only history, and views on history determine the political responses. History might narrow the 
options for the future, but there are still decisions to be made. Opposition to the Ohrid 
Agreement was mostly aired by nationalist intellectuals, the Macedonian media and political 
hardliners who all should not be taken as representative of the whole ethnic Macedonian 
population. Political resentment must also be seen in the context of the campaign for this 
year’s general elections. Especially the Prime Minister, Ljubcho Georgievski, and the main 
                                                     
21 It was the first vote in parliament according to the new voting procedures. Eight of those representatives who 
“ declared that they belonged to the communities not in the majority in the Republic of Macedonia”  did not 
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hawk in the government, Interior Minister Ljube Boshkovski, tried to present their VMRO-
DPMNE party to their ethnic Macedonian electorate as the only protector of the Macedonian 
nation and its state. While Georgievski and Boshkovski have strong nationalist credentials and 
are well known for irrational outbursts, they mainly seem concerned with the low popularity 
of their party. Around New Year, VMRO-DPMNE stood at less than 10 per cent in the 
opinion polls, while its main challenger SDSM was supported by between 14 and 25 per cent 
of the electorate (Jovanovski 2002, Bajic 2002). Nevertheless, the danger posed by 
Georgievski and Boshkovski should not be underestimated. Boshkovski, for instance, is 
responsible for the creation, legalisation and deployment of the exclusively ethnic 
Macedonian para-police unit the ‘Lions’ , whose members are said to be very close to 
nationalist circles within VMRO-DPMNE. Observers not only fear that the ‘Lions’  might be 
employed against the Albanians but also against contending Macedonian parties. Boshkovski 
threatened peace also by early redeployment of Macedonian police in previously rebel-held 
villages. The Social Democrats on the other hand attempted to present themselves as the 
moderate alternative that supported the Ohrid Agreement. This strategy has, according to the 
opinion polls, paid off. SDSM left the government of National Unity once the constitutional 
amendments had been passed in an effort not to be tarnished by further cooperation with the 
erratic prime minister (Brunnbauer 2001d: 362). The international community will have to 
make great efforts to support moderate voices in future, although without being seen as 
intervening directly or treating Macedonian as a protectorate. The greatest guess is now to 
predict what are the plans of the Albanian parties. The two major parties support the 
Agreement, but lost their main political objects of the last decade as a consequence. Thus the 
exclusive concentration on ethnic demands will cease to be a feasible political strategy. For 
the Albanian political factor, much depends on whether Ali Ahmeti and the disbanded UÇ K 
will enter the political race (Rusi 2002). There are some rumours in this regard, but at the 
moment any official political role for Ahmeti would be too much a provocation for the ethnic 
Macedonians, for whom he remains a perpetrator of war crimes. Nevertheless, among the 
Albanians, he is the most popular politician, and many hope that he will unite the notoriously 
quarrelsome Albanian political forces. 
 
For ordinary inhabitants though the main concerns seem to lie elsewhere. People are much 
more concerned by the deplorable state of the economy. The figures for 2001 look grim, as 
does the outlook for this year: GNP was down by 4.5 per cent, industrial production by 8.8 
                                                                                                                                                                      
support the law (Utrinski vesnik, 26 January 2002; Dnevnik, 26 January 2002). 
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per cent and even agricultural production by 13.3 per cent. Export shrank by 19.2 per cent and 
the trade balance deficit reached US-$ 513 million. The average salary amounted to € 170, 
while inflation was more than 5 per cent. Independent analysts put the unemployment rate at 
over 40 per cent, which is a record for Europe (Nanevska 2002). Some 42 per cent of the 
unemployed are less than thirty years old. Around 90 per cent of the population are said to 
live in outright poverty or on the verge of it. The government has no real ideas how to 
improve this situation, and is making matters worse by distributing some pre-election carrots 
which will put the budget further in the red. On the other hand, people close to the current and 
the former governments have accumulated considerable wealth over the past decade. While 
SDSM and PDP had also been involved in corruption scandals during their rule, VMRO-
DPMNE and DPA were even less scrupulous in plundering the remaining assets of the state. 
Privatization was fraught with corruption, and even the highest levels of power were involved 
in fraudulent schemes. During last year’s crisis, Defence Minister Ljuben Paunovski had for 
example to resign over allegations of fraud. VMRO-DPMNE is now rumoured to be one of 
the richest ‘companies’  in Macedonia, although political parties are prohibited by law to own 
economic enterprises. VMRO-DPMNE’s corruption and the failure to deliver on its promises 
are the main reasons for its current lack of popularity. It is very improbable that even a 
nationalistic campaign would lead to a success of VMRO-DPMNE at the forthcoming general 
elections. 
 
But the corruption scandals and the widespread poverty have a more generally disturbing 
effect on Macedonia’s political life: there is hardly anyone who enjoys enough popularity and 
trust to be able to provide much needed leadership. The political class is widely held in 
disdain, and people have lost the little trust they had in their ruling elite. Such a situation 
could be utilized by radical politicians with a ‘clean’  image and a coherent program. This has 
not been the case yet. It will therefore be one of the tasks of the international community to 
prevent Macedonia sliding in a radical direction that would threaten the troublesome 
compromise of Ohrid. For this not to happen, it is first necessary to provide financial support 
for the implementation of the Agreement. Second, a realistic perspective of integration into 
the European Union must be opened in order to give Macedonians and Albanians the feeling 
that both have a stake in the development of their country. And third, the international 
community must address the ethnic Macedonians’  fears and their perceived lack of security. 
The border to Kosovo must be better controlled and intrusions from Kosovo be prevented. 
The International Community has to give Macedonians also the feeling that their ethnic 
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identity is not threatened any more. The country should therefore be recognised by its self-
chosen name (‘Republic of Macedonia’), which by the way is also used in the Ohrid 
Agreement (International Crisis Group 2001c). 
 
It would be an illusion to believe that Macedonians (and Albanians) would now suddenly 
define themselves and their attitudes towards the state in civic terms. This is a country where 
national identity is defined in ethnic terms, and that will not change immediately (see Loomis, 
Davis and Broughton 2001). But one precondition for the development of stronger civic 
identities is to generate exactly the kind of security people must feel with their cultural 
identity. Only then will the extraordinary obsession of the Macedonian public with questions 
of ethnic identity and national history give way to more inclusive modes of identification. 
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